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The vast majority of Russian corporations are still compelled to become closed joint-stock 
companies that lack a modern fundrising mechanism in order to attract capital from a wide 
range of private investors.  This is due to factors such as significant insider ownership, a 
strong orientation among managers toward closed organizations, slumping needs for corporate 
finance, and underdeveloped local financial institutions.  The impact of ownership structure 
on the choice of corporate form exists, even if we assume that the two elements are determined 
endogenously.  Under these circumstances, however, a significant number of closed 
companies attempt to develop more open internal organizational structures that are virtually 
the same as those of open companies.    Nonetheless, such an institutional coupling of a closed 
corporate form and an open internal organizational structure is far from effective in resolving 
the imminent governance problems facing Russian corporations, such as the prevention of 
infighting among executives and shareholders and the implementation of discipline among top 
management. 
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1. Introduction 
The Russian corporate sector went through a fundamental transition to a capitalist economy 
triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As of 2005, private corporations accounted for 
about 65% of the country’s GDP, nearly 88.6% of its industrial production, and about 91.5% of its 
total employment (EBRD 2005; Rosstat 2007).
1 Even though state control over “strategic 
industries” continues, the overwhelming dominance of state-owned enterprises in the Russian 
economy is already a thing of the past.  In addition, in recent years, there have been a growing 
number of new market entries by private firms against the background of a remarkable economic 
recovery, and new small and medium-sized companies led by entrepreneurs of the new generation 
have been popping up one after another, tapping new markets by filling every niche in the national 
economy. 
However, the fact is that Russia’s business sector is mainly composed of former socialist 
enterprises that underwent corporatization as a result of the mass-privatization policy in the early 
1990s followed by the monetary privatization of the largest companies.  To achieve the political 
goal of redistribution of state assets to the general public in an equal manner, these former 
state-owned enterprises were compelled by law to transform themselves into joint-stock companies 
(JSCs).  Most of their shares were transferred for free or at extremely low prices to citizens, 
especially to the worker collectives and managers of the enterprises (Blasi, Kroumova, and Kruze 
1997).  This means that leading Russian business firms were founded in a completely different 
way from those in the U.S. and other industrialized countries.  In addition, considering the 
underdeveloped financial sector and the premature markets for capital and managers in this country, 
which has only a short history as a capitalist state, Russian enterprises are in a very peculiar 
business environment compared to their Western counterparts. 
The preponderance of closed JSCs in comparison to open JSCs is one of the most 
distinguishing features of the Russian corporate sector.    This phenomenon may be revealed under 
the special circumstances surrounding Russian enterprises mentioned above.  Both open and 
closed JSCs are statutory legal forms of incorporation, as defined in the Federal Law on Joint-Stock 
Companies (hereinafter, the Law on JSCs).  As we will later detail, these two corporate forms 
refer to the legal names of the two types of JSCs that are decisively different from each other in 
terms of share transferability to a third party.    All JSCs established in Russia must choose either of 
the two company types as their statutory organizational form.  As of January 1, 2005, there were 
only 58,400 open JSCs registered in Russia compared with as many as 389,200 closed JSCs.
2  
Regarding large-scale companies that require raising funds from outside sources, the number of 
open JSCs exceeds that of closed JSCs, with the latter number still being fairly significant.    In fact, 
a survey conducted in 2003 by the Federal State Statistics Service found that, of the 32,266 JSCs 
surveyed, excluding micro- and small enterprises, 19,407 were open companies, and the remaining 
12,859 were closed ones (Rosstat 2004).  In other words, four of every ten medium-sized and 
                                                        
1  Including companies of mixed ownership. 
2  According to unpublished official statistics.   3
large Russian corporations were operating under a governance mechanism that put rigorous 
restrictions on the liquidity of their own shares. 
In many developed countries, JSCs are allowed to achieve “virtual” organizational closedness 
by, for instance, making a special resolution at their general shareholder meeting that bans, in 
principle, the transfer of their shares to a third party, or by adding a provision to this effect in their 
corporate charter.  For example, in Japan, JSCs intending to make it mandatory for their 
shareholders to seek their approval for the transfer of their shares must provide a provision to that 
effect in their corporate charter in accordance with Article 107 of the Company Law, and 
companies with such a provision are generally called “closed companies.” This practice is common 
among smaller companies.  There is no formal closed JSC as a legal corporate form in the 
continental European countries either.    In the U.K., on the other hand, business firms are formally 
classified according to Company Law into public companies and private companies depending on 
how they raise funds, and private companies have similar statutory characteristics to those of 
closed JSCs in Russia. Furthermore, several states in the U.S. have a Company Law that allows 
closed corporations to impose restrictions on the issuance and transfer of common stock in 
accordance with a shareholder agreement, in contrast to general corporations.  In most of these 
states, the number of shareholders for closed corporations is strictly limited (e.g., to 30 in Nevada 
and Delaware and to 50 in Georgia and Wisconsin), as in Russia.
3    This suggests that the Russian 
company law had broken away from the tradition of continental law and boldly incorporated some 
elements of common law.  However, in Russia, there are clear distinctions between closed and 
open JSCs in terms of not only the restrictions on the number of shareholders but also the modes of 
securities issuance, the required levels of minimum capital, and disclosure obligations.    From this 
viewpoint, Russia has an extremely unique legal framework in comparison with the U.K. and U.S.   
Moreover, as reported above, even though almost all of the Russian leading companies are former 
state-owned firms, about 40% of them are still operated as closed JSCs after more than 10 years of 
mass privatization.   This highlights the sharp contrast with the situation of closed corporations in 
the U.K. and U.S., most of which are family-run or privately held companies.
4 
Inspired by the economic theory on internal organization that has been developed from 
suggestions made by Coase (1937), a large number of empirical studies have been conducted with 
regard to the determinants of organizational choice and the relationship between organizational 
form and behavior, including corporate performance.  The subjects of these studies are broad, 
such as the choice between outlets owned by franchisees and those owned by franchisers (Brickley 
and Dark 1987); the relationship between contract types for international joint venture projects and 
political risks (Phillips-Patrick 1991); the impacts of the spin-off and reorganization of limited 
                                                        
3  For more details, see the studies on comparative law by Kraakman et al. (2004) and McCahery, 
Raaijmakers, and Vermeulen (2004).  Concerning closed corporations in the U.S., Allen and 
Kraakman (2003), Pinto and Branson (2004), and Mitchell and Mitchell (2006) provide detailed 
descriptions and useful case studies. 
4  For instance, an overwhelming majority of U.S. closed corporations are family-owned firms that 
represent 95 percent of all American businesses and are responsible for about 50 percent of U.S. 
employment (Bauman, Palmiter, and Partnoy 2007, p. 339).   4
companies on corporate value (Denning and Shastri 1993); the organizational advantages of the 
multidivisional form (M-form) organization over the unitary form (U-form) (Weir 1996); the 
relationship between corporate form and growth/survival rate (Harhhoff, Stahl, and Woywode 
1998); the organizational choices of insurance distribution systems (Regan and Tzeng 1999) and 
gasoline retailers (Blass and Carlton 2001); the impact of liability systems on the choice of oil 
transportation system (Brooks 2002); the organizational choice between closed-end and open-end 
investment funds (Deli and Varma 2002); the choice of the contract type for driver employment in 
the European trucking industry (Arruñada, González-Díaz, and Fernández 2004); the correlation 
between international disparities in the business environment and differences in the business 
incorporation rate among countries (Demirguc-Kunt, Love, and Maksimovic 2004); and the 
organizational form choice between real estate investment trust and master limited partnership and 
its impacts on company management (Damodaran, John, and Liu 2005).  Surprisingly, however, 
except for a valuable case study by Karpoff and Rice (1989), there is little empirical work 
investigating organizational choices by JSCs and their possible impacts on corporate governance 
and firm performance.  Thus, the corporate forms of Russian JSCs are a very important research 
subject to be explored from the viewpoint of the study of law and economics. 
Furthermore, this topic is of great significance to understand the Russian economic system.  
As long as the primary nature of a public company can be defined as a modern economic 
mechanism that attracts capital from a wide range of private investors and multiplies their wealth in 
the most effective way possible, an open company, which guarantees free share transferability, is 
the basic form of a stock company.    In this sense, a closed JSC is one that distances itself from the 
fundamental purpose of a modern corporation.  In addition, the agency theory suggests that an 
open organizational architecture is quite effective not only in inhibiting the opportunistic behaviors 
of company managers and disciplining them toward the maximization of shareholder equity but 
also in diversifying risks for investors who are entitled to residual assets under the separation of 
ownership and management (Fama and Jensen 1983a, 1983b).  This can also be said of the 
modern Russian economy still in transition to a market economy.  Nevertheless, as previously 
reported, the reality in Russia is that not only small corporations but also large enterprises are still 
being organized and operated as closed JSCs.  It is quite possible that the high degree of 
orientation towards closed organization in the Russian business sector is inseparably linked to its 
poor corporate governance practices and its investment behavior, which remains inactive regardless 
of significant economic recovery in recent years.   In other words, it is highly likely that there are 
severe agency problems within these Russian closed companies which prevent the enhancement of 
their corporate value.    In order to redress this situation, it is critical to empirically investigate what 
factors drive many Russian firms to choose to become closed companies and how much harm is 
done to Russian corporate management by the closed corporate form.  Therefore, particular 
attention should also be given to research on the legal forms of incorporation of Russian JSCs in 
the context of Russian economic studies.  To date, there have been only a handful of economic 
studies touching on this topic, including that of Dolgopyatova (1995), and virtually no detailed 
research has been conducted in this area.   5
An attempt is made in this paper to deal with this significant but yet-to-be explored issue on 
the basis of a large-scale enterprise survey.  This survey was conducted in 2005 within the 
framework of a Japan-Russia joint research project.  It covers more than 800 manufacturing and 
communications firms located throughout the Russian Federation that, together, provide an ideal 
sample group representing the country’s medium-sized and large JSCs.  Relying upon the results 
of the joint survey, we first examine a variety of factors as to why Russian firms elect to become 
closed JSCs.  In the latter part of this paper, we deal with the relationship between the corporate 
forms and internal organizational structures in addition to the impact of these institutional 
couplings on organizational behavior, including firm performance.    Through these research steps, 
we intend to provide new perspectives on the causality between corporate forms and organizational 
behavior.  We found that Russian firms tend to choose the closed JSC as their legal form of 
incorporation due to factors such as significant insider ownership, a strong orientation among 
managers toward closed organizations, slumping needs for corporate finance, and underdeveloped 
local financial institutions.    The impact of ownership structure on the choice of corporate form by 
Russian firms exists even when the two elements are explicitly endogenized.  Under these 
circumstances, a significant number of closed companies attempt to develop more open internal 
organizational structures that are virtually the same as those in open JSCs.  Nonetheless, we 
confirmed that such an institutional coupling of a closed corporate form and an open internal 
organizational structure is far from effective in resolving the imminent governance problems facing 
Russian corporations, such as the prevention of infighting among executives and shareholders and 
the implementation of discipline among top management. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:    Section 2 describes the data we used for 
this study.  Section 3 looks into the legal framework regulating the corporate forms of Russian 
JSCs as well as its significance in the context of corporate management.  Section 4 examines the 
determinants of organizational choices between open and closed JSCs.  Section 5 focuses on the 
institutional complementarity of corporate forms and internal organizational structures.    Section 6 
empirically assesses the impact of the institutional equilibrium of a corporate organization on 
corporate governance and firm performance.    Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
As the basis for the empirical analysis in this paper, we have employed the results of a 
large-scale enterprise survey conducted in 2005 throughout Russia by a Japan-Russia joint research 
team from Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo and the Higher School of Economics in Moscow.  
The enterprise survey was designed to illuminate the evolutionary process of firm organization and 
business environments in transforming Russia, shedding light on corporate governance in former 
socialist enterprises. 
The survey was conducted from February to June 2005.  A total of 859 members of top 
management from industrial and communications enterprises from 64 federal districts were 
interviewed on-site by professional staff members dispatched from the Levada Center, the former   6
USSR Public Opinion Poll Center of the Ministry of Labor, or its local branches.
5   The target 
companies were selected by the method of stratified sampling among firms with more than 100 
workers in year-average terms.  One out of three companies initially solicited refused to 
participate in the research.  Among the 859 companies surveyed, 822 firms gave valid answers.  
Of these 822 respondents, 94.8% were company presidents, CEOs, general directors, or vice 
presidents.  The remaining respondents were board chairmen (1.6%) and senior managers 
responsible for corporate governance affairs (3.6%). 
All samples were JSCs, and the average number of workers per company was 1,884 (standard 
deviation: 5,570; median: 465).  Reflecting the research focus of the joint project on the former 
state-owned enterprises transformed into JSCs as a result of the mass-privatization policy and their 
de novo private counterparts established in the transition period, the surveyed firms are biased 
toward large and medium-sized enterprises.    As the significant gap between the mean and median 
of total workers per company indicates, the sample firms include many of Russia’s big businesses.   
The total number of workers of these surveyed firms was 1,549,008, and, according to official 
statistics, they accounted for 10.3% of the average workforce in both the industrial and the 
communication sectors through 2004 (Rosstat 2005).   With regard to the regional and sectoral 
composition of the surveyed firms, they constitute a representative sample of Russian core 
companies. 
As for their corporate form, open and closed JSCs account for 67.3% (553 firms) and 32.7% 
(269 firms) of the 822 surveyed firms, respectively, and this composition corresponds closely to the 
results of the 2003 survey by the Russian statistical office referred to in the Introduction.  The 
closed JSCs covered by the joint survey include four workers’ joint-stock companies (people’s 
enterprises).    Because the workers’ JSCs are run under a system that is substantially different from 
that of standard closed JSCs, including the incorporation of capital management rules, the structure 
and power allocation of the supervisory and executive organs, and the election and remuneration of 
corporate officers (Iwasaki 2007a, pp. 240-43), we have excluded all workers’ JSCs from the 
observations when they were inappropriate to include in empirical analysis.
6 
 
3. Corporate Forms of Joint-stock Companies in Russia: Institutional Framework and Its 
Significance for Company Management 
In this section, the institutional diversity of open and closed JSCs is discussed, and the 
significance of each of these two corporate forms is then clarified in terms of company 
management and how the managers interviewed in this survey perceive the main factors 
determining their firm’s choice of their current legal form of incorporation. 
As reported in the Introduction, an investor who intends to establish a stock company in 
Russia must choose to make it either an open JSC or a closed JSC as required by the provisions of 
                                                        
5  The questionnaire used for the joint survey was carefully designed by the project members and 
specialists of the Levada Center based on similar surveys conducted in the past, although it is 
impossible to completely avoid bias and moral hazard problems with respect to self-reporting. 
6  Dolgopyatova and Iwasaki (2006) provide more detailed information on the results of the joint 
survey.   7
Russian corporate law,
7 which provides for statutory distinctions between these two types of 
corporate forms in the following six areas: (a) share transferability; (b) method for issuing 
securities; (c) required minimum capitalization; (d) number of shareholders; (e) government 
funding; and (f) disclosure obligations (see Table 1). 
First, a shareholder of an open JSC may freely transfer his/her shares to any third party other 
than another shareholder of the company or the company itself; on the other hand, a shareholder of 
a closed JSC must sell his/her shares first to another shareholder of the company or the company 
itself due to the right of preferential purchase.  Specifically, a shareholder of a closed JSC who 
intends to transfer his/her shares to a third party must, at his/her own expense, notify all other 
shareholders of the company and its executives in writing concerning the selling price of the shares 
by the selling shareholder as well as other terms and conditions included in an agreement between 
the seller and the purchasing third party.    This is done in order to confirm whether any of the other 
shareholders of the company or the company itself wishes to execute its right of preferential 
purchase.  This obligation enables a closed JSC and its shareholders to detect in advance every 
action by any shareholder seeking to transfer his/her shares to a third party and to allow the other 
shareholders to effectively prevent a stock drain to outside parties by bearing the necessary 
expenses to purchase these shares.
8 
Secondly, unlike open JSCs, whose shares issued at the time of formation may be allocated to 
the company founders and to the general public (i.e., establishment with outside offering), closed 
JSCs are only required to issue their shares to their founders and to other investors specified in 
advance.    Even after incorporation, closed JSCs are not allowed to offer new shares to the general 
public, although they may issue corporate bonds other than convertible bonds on the securities 
market as a means of raising funds from outside sources. 
Thirdly, the minimum capitalization (share capital) for open JSCs needs to be at least 1,000 
times the statutory minimum wage at the time of their registration, while closed JSCs are required 
to secure only 100 times the statutory minimum wage.  For example, the effective statutory 
minimum wage for the period from January to August 2005 was 720 rubles (about USD25) 
monthly.
9  Therefore, there is a difference of 648,000 rubles (about USD23,000) between these 
two legal forms of JSCs established during this period with respect to their minimum share capital 
as required by the Law on JSCs, not a trivial difference for small and venture businesses seeking 
incorporation. 
                                                        
7  These provisions refer to the Civil Code, Part I, Chapter 4, Articles 96 to 104, and to the Law on 
JSCs.  This section was written taking into account the laws and regulations that were effective in 
Russia during the period in which the enterprise survey was conducted and which was used as the 
base material for this empirical study.   
8   Article 7 of the Regulations for Joint-Stock Companies approved by the Resolution of the RSFSR 
Cabinet of Ministers No. 601 of December 25, 1990, which was later replaced by the current Law on 
JSCs, provided that the shareholders of a closed JSC were prohibited from transferring their shares 
without the approval of the majority of all the shareholders of that closed JSC.  The share transfer 
restriction provided in the Law on JSCs now in effect is less severe than that in the Regulations for 
Joint-Stock Companies that was in force until the end of 1995. 
9    Refer to Article 1 of the amended Federal Law on Minimum Wages of December 29, 2004.   8
Fourthly, closed JSCs may not have more than 50 shareholders.  If the number of 
shareholders exceeds this limit, they must reduce it to 50 or less, turn it into an open JSC, or 
dissolve within a period of one year.    However, this regulation does not apply to closed companies 
established by the end of 1995 before the enforcement of the current law on JSCs.  This is 
primarily because of the consideration given to former state-owned enterprises that transformed 
into JSCs during the course of the mass-privatization policy implemented in the early 1990s.  In 
addition, the August 1996 presidential decree, in which closed JSCs with more than 25% of their 
shares owned by the government were ordered to become open companies to accelerate the sales of 
state-owned shares, was not a very strong legally binding instrument, since no effective penalties or 
sanctions were imposed on those violating the decree (Iwasaki 2007a).
10   As a result, there are 
still a large number of closed JSCs with 50 or more shareholders, many of which are either former 
state-owned enterprises and ex-municipal companies that were privatized in the process of the 
mass-privatization policy launched in the early 1990s or affiliates of private firms and brand-new 
companies opened in those days. 
Fifthly, no state authority, including a local government, can be the founder of a JSC in 
principle.    In addition, even when a JSC is established by a government or state organization using 
a company separation package in which the newly established joint company inherits the assets of 
the government or state organization, that newly established company must be an open JSC.  
However, this regulation does not apply to cases in which a corporation is established by a 
government or state agency as a result of its separation from a privatized firm.    This is one of the 
reasons that there are still many closed JSCs whose shares are held by the state. 
Lastly, open JSCs are obliged to disclose information such as annual business reports, 
financial statements, asset securities reports, and other materials required by statute or requested by 
the Federal Financial Markets Service (FFMS) and other government authorities.
11 On the other 
hand, closed JSCs are not subject to such disclosure requirements, except in cases in which they 
issue bonds and other securities using the schemes and prices specified by financial authorities. 
Meanwhile, as pointed out by Emery, Lewellen, and Mauer (1988) and Gordon and 
Mackie-Mason (1994), tax distortion can have a significant impact on the decision-making process 
for investors and enterprises concerning organizational choices.  However, in Russia, there is no 
rule similar to that of the “S” corporation in the U.S.,
12 and there are no differences in the 
                                                        
10   Refer to the Presidential Decree on Measures to Protect the Rights of Shareholders and to Ensure the 
Interests of the State as an Owner and Shareholder of August 18, 1996.    This decree lost its effect in 
February 2005 with the amendment of the Bankruptcy Law. 
11  After the Russian government adopted International Accounting Standards (IAS) in 1997, the 
nation’s accounting system saw some improvements every year in compliance with the Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) for industrialized countries.  However, there are still 
some problems in terms of the accuracy and transparency of disclosed company information because 
of the failure to enforce the IAS at all enterprises as well as because of the insufficient number of 
auditing firms and accountants (Saito 2003; Iwasaki 2007a). 
12  In the U.S., a company with an “S corporation” status granted by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
may file a composite tax return of corporate income and loss together with stakeholder’s personal 
income in order to prevent double taxation of corporate profits for general corporations and personal 
income tax for dividends.   9
applicable tax provisions between open and closed JSCs, including the corporate profit tax and the 
personal income tax on dividend earnings from invested companies.  Both of these corporate 
forms are regulated by the principle of equal taxation with respect to corporate ownership, 
investors, and capital sources.
13    Moreover, Russia has no provisions set out in the Federal Law on 
Bankruptcy, the Corporate Governance Code, or any other legislation that could seriously affect the 
choice of the corporate form by a JSC. 
The results of the Japan-Russia joint enterprise survey, in which company executives were 
asked to explain how they perceived the significance of the aforesaid legal framework in the 
context of their corporate management as well as to indicate the most important reason for them to 
keep their company in the current corporate form, revealed that many of the respondents 
recognized that the choice between an open and a closed JSC had a considerable impact on their 
management strategies.  Of 793 firms that provided valid responses to the survey, 602 (75.9%) 
replied that their corporate-form choice would or might affect their business development; this is 
far more than the 191 (24.1%) that answered that there was no connection between these two 
factors.    The difference between the group of open JSCs and the group of closed JSCs covered in 
the survey regarding the proportion of firms that confirmed a connection between their 
organizational choice and their business development is statistically significant at the 10% level 
(χ
2=3.209, p=0.073), but, in actuality, it was quite small (77.8% vs. 72.0%).    Of the 602 firms that 
said that their performance was influenced by their corporate form, 518 (86.0%) perceived such an 
influence to be positive for their business growth, many more than the 84 firms (14.0%) that 
regarded it as negative.  The difference between the group of open JSCs and the group of closed 
JSCs regarding the number of firms that positively perceived such an influence on their 
performance was very small (85.7% vs. 86.7%) and not statistically significant (χ
2=0.098, p=0.754).  
Regardless of the difference in the corporate form of their companies, a great number of corporate 
executives see an inseparable relationship between their organizational choice and business 
activities. 
Table 2 summarizes the answers given by company managers to a question about the 
comparative advantages of each of the two corporate form options.  Of the enterprises reporting 
that open JSCs were institutionally superior to closed JSCs, 395 firms (68.3%) answered that open 
JSCs were better than closed JSCs in building a reliable relationship with investors and partners or 
in raising funds from outside financial sources.  This number is greater than the number of firms 
reporting that an organizational advantage of open JSCs is the flexibility of share transfers, which 
reflects their current focus.  A substantial and statistically significant difference is evident 
between the open and closed JSCs in the breakdown of their answers to this question.    Compared 
with the respondents of open JSCs, those of closed JSCs pay more attention to the fact that open 
JSCs enjoy good fundraising capabilities.    At the same time, however, there are many managers of 
                                                        
13  Refer to Article 3 of Part I of the Tax Code.  Although it is not reported in Article 3, it is widely 
recognized that the principle of equal taxation is construed to be applicable to both open and closed 
JSCs (Abrosimov et al. 2005, p. 10).  In fact, in Russia, joint-stock companies are treated in the 
same way as limited and other types of companies in terms of taxation.   10
closed JSCs who do not see any advantage in the corporate form of open JSCs.  As for closed 
JSCs, most executives, regardless of whether they are working for closed or open JSCs, agree that 
closed companies can more effectively prevent their firms from transferring stocks to outsiders and 
avoid the threat of hostile takeovers.    There is no remarkable difference between the two company 
groups in the breakdown of their answers to the above question. 
Table 3 contains the results of the answers of our respondents to the question of what was the 
most important reason for their companies maintaining their current corporate form.  Compared 
with 11.8%, who identified it as being related to legal restrictions concerning the number of 
shareholders and the minimum required capital, 75.5% replied that it was because of the 
mass-privatization policy in the early 1990s or because of a management decision made on their 
own or by their shareholders.  The result that 54.4% of the open JSCs reported that they had 
become open JSCs due to the mass-privatization policy is quite understandable, given that the 
Federal Government had strongly encouraged soon-to-be-privatized enterprises to become open 
JSCs by facilitating a swap between privatization vouchers distributed to the general public free of 
charge and the shares of state-owned and municipal enterprises.  On the other hand, in 
consideration of the fact that managers and worker collectives are still the dominant shareholders in 
many Russian firms and in light of the strong orientation of these insiders toward organizational 
closedness, it is reasonable for them to favor a closed JSC as the legal form of incorporation for 
their company due to the uncertain social environment typical of a period of transition. 
 
4. Choice of Corporate Form 
In Russia, the growing trend toward a market economy and its integration into the global 
economy is forcing domestic firms to tackle the issue of optimal adaptation to ever-changing 
business environments.  Hence, it is not uncommon for Russian corporations to make a major 
change in their company profile, including their form of incorporation.
14  For  instance,  companies 
change from limited to joint-stock stature and vice versa much more frequently than they do in 
Western countries.  Needless to say, transformations from open JSCs to closed JSCs and vice 
versa take place all the time, although the latter can only take place by amending the company 
charter through a special resolution at a general shareholders’ meeting and then officially 
registering such an amendment (Tikhomirov 2001, p. 91). 
Although the law on JSCs stipulates that the amendment of a company charter must be made 
through a special resolution passed by a majority of at least three-fourths of the votes cast by the 
shareholders with voting shares in attendance, this provision is not a serious obstacle to such 
amendments.  This is due to the fact that, in many Russian companies, a small number of 
                                                        
14  In fact, experts at the Levada Center Social Research Institution who assisted with the enterprise 
survey, drawing upon their experience with panel surveys conducted before and after 2005, 
confirmed that only about 600 to 700 of 1,000 firms could claim that their company profile was 
nearly unchanged for a period of 3 years after being surveyed.  The remaining 300 to 400 firms 
were excluded from the panel surveys because they had already closed, changed their business, or 
made significant organizational changes.   11
shareholders own a significant amount of the total shares, which means that, for the top 
management and major shareholders of Russian stock companies, the issue of whether their firms 
should be open or closed JSCs is just an “operational” variable, even after their establishment. 
The discussion in the previous section highlights the differences between open and closed 
JSCs as a corporate form option available in Russia and the significance of these two corporate 
forms from the viewpoint of corporate management as well as the impact of the mass-privatization 
policy on the decision-making process of stock-issuing companies with respect to whether they 
should be open or closed JSCs.  Based on these facts revealed by our enterprise survey, this 
section is a theoretical and empirical analysis of the organizational choice mechanism of Russian 
corporations. 
4.1. Theoretical Considerations 
According to the economic theory of the organization and the firm advocated and developed 
by Alchian and Demsetz (1972), Jensen and Meckling (1976), Mayers and Smith (1981), 
Williamson (1985, 1996), Milgrom and Roberts (1992), Jensen (2000), Furubotn and Richter 
(2005), and others, the differences between the institutional settings of open and closed JSCs would 
affect the incentives and decision-making processes of corporate managers and shareholders with 
respect to their choice of corporate form through the following three mechanisms. 
The first mechanism is the asset effect of restrictions on share transfers; that is, any 
restrictions imposed on a closed company’s share transfers will undermine the liquidity and value 
of such shares as financial commodities.    Furthermore, as explained in Section 3, a shareholder of 
a closed JSC intending to transfer his/her shares to a third party must bear all the costs needed to 
confirm if any of the other shareholders in the closed JSC or the company itself wishes to execute 
their right of preferential purchase.    Therefore, those who invest money purely to gain a return on 
their investment (i.e., portfolio investors) will buy the shares of open JSCs rather than those of 
closed JSCs, all else being equal.  By the same logic, corporate executives would prefer the 
corporate form of an open company from the standpoint of issuing securities to raise funds from 
outside sources, since a closed company must pay for all the marginal capital costs equal to the 
transaction costs for the transfer of its own shares to a third party and the cost of a low liquidity 
premium on its own shares.    Closed JSCs are further placed at a disadvantage over open JSCs due 
to the ban on issuing any convertible bonds.  Furthermore, as indicated in Table 2, choosing to 
adopt the open company as its legal form of incorporation will increase the transparency of a firm’s 
management, making it easier for the firm to receive loans from banks and other financial 
institutions.  Considering the above, we hypothesize that the higher a firm’s fundraising demand, 
the more likely it is to be operated as an open JSC. 
The second mechanism is the governance effect of share transfer restrictions.  Tight 
restrictions imposed on a closed JSC as to the transfer of its shares significantly decrease the 
possibility of a change in its internal control or ownership that might otherwise come about due to 
an “exit” from the company of its shares sold, a tender offer, a proxy fight, or a bankruptcy.    Such 
restrictions pose a serious impediment to the reshuffling of a management body that has failed to   12
institute effective corporate discipline and achieve the expected results.  Therefore, from the 
standpoint of which corporate form has a relatively better corporate governance mechanism, 
shareholders are more inclined to invest in open JSCs.  On the other hand, as illustrated in the 
previous section, the understanding by corporate executives that the biggest advantage of a closed 
company lies in the protection it offers against outside environments suggests that they have a 
strong inclination towards managerial entrenchment that enables them to eliminate supervision and 
intervention from outside as much as possible and to avoid external discipline. Accordingly, we 
predict that corporate managers who wish to retain their managerial discretion to behave in an 
opportunistic way or who wish to avoid the risk of outsiders attempting a hostile takeover will 
choose to establish and maintain their firms as closed stock companies. 
The third mechanism is the information effect of state disclosure regulations.  The  disclosure 
obligation imposed only on open JSCs by the state produces the effect of alleviating the 
information asymmetry between executives and investors in favor of the latter.  This, in turn, 
causes more shareholders to invest in open JSCs, which have a better governance system than 
closed JSCs, and more managers to operate their firms as closed companies. The discussions on 
both the second and the third mechanisms as to the organizational choice of a corporate form can 
be summarized in the following hypothesis: the influence of non-managerial shareholders 
increases the possibility of firms becoming open JSCs as their organizational choices, while, on the 
other hand, the influence of managers increases the possibility of firms becoming closed JSCs. 
In addition to the three mechanisms above, it is necessary to focus on the widespread 
existence of business groups (i.e., financial-industrial groups or holding companies) as a factor 
having a significant impact on the organizational choices between open and closed JSCs in 
Russia.
15  In fact, the joint survey revealed that 35.7% of the manufacturing companies (268 of 
751 firms) and 77.5% of the communications companies (55 of 71 firms) were controlled by 
certain business groups through shareholding.  From this point of view, a fourth mechanism of 
organizational choice may be imposed; that is, a company’s participation in a business group is 
effective in protecting it from outside threats, especially intervention into company management by 
state administrations and public bureaucrats, which is a serious problem for Russian firms.    This is 
due to the political countervailing power of the business group the company belongs to and the 
corrective cohesion among member firms (Iwasaki and Suzuki 2007).  As a result, the 
organizational advantages of a closed JSC as an “institutional defense barrier” may become less 
important for managers of group companies.  Furthermore, it is undesirable for management of a 
holding company or a core company of a business group to impose severe restrictions on the 
transfer of shares by its controlling companies, not only from the standpoint of a large shareholder 
of the group firms but also from that of the group’s goal of ensuring effective asset management 
within the group.   Therefore, we assume that a firm’s participation in a business group increases 
the possibility of the firm being operated as an open JSC.  
However, with the hierarchy within such business groups expanding, enterprises in the lower 
                                                        
15  See Johnson (1997), Perotti and Gelfer (2001), Hoffman (2002), Klepach and Yakovlev (2004), and 
Guriev and Rachinsky (2005) for details on the financial-industrial groups and oligarchs in Russia.   13
echelons are more likely to be established by their hierarchically upper companies as wholly owned 
subsidiaries or dummy firms for account-rigging or tax evasion purposes, and these enterprises are 
usually closed companies bound by less strict disclosure obligations.  Consequently, we also 
predict that the organizational scale of a business group is positively correlated with the proportion 
of closed JSCs in the member firms of that group. 
Lastly, as explained above, taking into account the background of Russia’s privatization policy 
and its legal restrictions on state investment, the past policies on company start-ups may have a 
historical path-dependent impact on organizational choices between open and closed JSCs.  This 
is the fifth mechanism.  From this consideration, we hypothesize that privatized enterprises and 
companies separated from state-owned or municipal companies are more likely to choose to 
operate as open JSCs in comparison with private companies newly established after the fall of the 
communist regime. 
In summary, Russian stock companies branch away to either open JSCs or closed JSCs 
through the interaction of the aforementioned five mechanisms of organizational choice. 
4.2. Empirical Assessment 
In this subsection, we empirically test the theoretical mechanism of making a corporate-form 
choice, as well as its impact and statistical significance of choosing each alternative.    We estimate 
our organizational choice models by probit methods using a discrete variable, which takes a value 
of 1 for closed JSCs as the dependent variable (CLOCOM), as well as adapting the following 
independent variables: (a) ownership variables representing the influence of shareholders and 
managers over organizational strategies, (b) variables concerning the constraints affecting capital 
demand and supply of the company; (c) variables regarding the linkage between a company with a 
business group and the organizational scale of that group; (d) variables concerning the impact of 
past policies on company start-ups; and (e) other control variables. 
The variables of outside ownership utilized in our estimation are the 6-point-scale ownership 
share of non-managerial shareholders excluding domestic individuals (OWNOUT) and that of the 
state (OWNSTA) and private shareholders (OWNPRI), each of which is further classified into the 
federal government (OWNFED), regional and local governments (OWNREG), commercial banks 
(OWNBAN), investment funds and other financial institutions (OWNFIN), non-financial corporate 
shareholders (OWNCOR), and foreign investors (OWNFOR).  As for managers, a large 
management shareholder dummy (MANSHA) is adapted.    In it, if a manager or group of managers 
is a major shareholder of his or her own company, that company is assigned a value of 1.
16 
                                                        
16  In other words, domestic individual shareholders, including employee shareholders, are treated as a 
reference category.  The experience of our joint research team and that of other researchers 
indicates that many Russian top managers do not have sufficient data on company ownership by 
employees, ownership by other managers, or ownership by the relatives, families, or acquaintances 
of employees, all of whom are categorized as outside individual shareholders.  Therefore, their 
answers to our questions about their insider ownership may contain substantive measurement errors.   
In addition, the reason that we used a large management shareholder dummy variable that represents 
the position of managers as corporate owners is that it is quite difficult to ask managers to submit 
accurate data on their own shareholding rate; making such a request of managers is very likely to 
result in their refusal to participate in the survey.   14
The variables used as proxies of a company’s capital demand are a securities-issuing planning 
dummy (SECPLA).    In it, if the company has a plan to issue securities in Russia in the near future, 
it is assigned a value of 1, whereas, if the company has a plan to issue shares and bonds in foreign 
financial markets, where more stringent rules than those in Russia are enforced with respect to 
organizational management and disclosure, it is assigned a value of 2.  If neither of these two 
conditions applies, it is assigned a value of 0.  A relationship-banking dummy (RELBAN) is used 
for companies with a long-term credit relationship with a certain commercial bank.    On the other 
hand, as a proxy for representing the constraints affecting the capital procurement of a company, 
the number of financial institutions per 1,000 non-financial corporations in a federal district where 
the company is located (NUMFIN) is introduced.  NUMFIN is used because, except in a few big 
cities, local commercial banks and investment firms play a critical role in the field of investment 
financing and financial consulting services for the corporate sector, and the development of these 
local financial institutions is an overriding factor affecting the fundraising abilities of local 
companies. 
The variables for the relationship between a company and the business group to which the 
company belongs are a group firm dummy (GROFIR) assigned a value of 1 if the company is a 
member of a certain holding company or another business group by owning stocks; and a core 
corporation dummy (GROCOR) and an affiliate firm dummy (GROAFF), both of which reflect the 
characteristics of the company’s group membership.  The organizational size of the business 
group is represented by the natural logarithm of the total number of its member firms (GROSIZ). 
The impact of past policies on company start-ups is assessed using two dummy variables from 
the standpoint of the importance of the mass-privatization policy and the statutory regulations on 
investments by state agencies.  Namely, PRICOM is assigned a value of 1 if the company is a 
privatized firm of a former state-owned or ex-municipal enterprise.  SPIOFF captures firms spun 
off from state-owned enterprises or privatized companies.
17  The control variables include the 
natural logarithm of the total number of employees representing the company size (COMSIZ) and a 
series of industry dummy variables that control industrial fixed effects. 
In accordance with our theoretical considerations in Subsection 4.1, we expect that the 
ownership by non-managerial shareholders represented in OWNOUT and other variables restrains 
companies from being closed JSCs; in other words, outsider ownership is negatively correlated 
with the choice of a closed JSC.  The sign of MANSHA cannot be specified at this stage, as it 
varies depending on which element is more powerful: the marginal assessment value of shares 
owned by a manager or a group of managers or the additional benefits the manager obtains by 
operating a closed company.  All three variables concerning capital demand and supply are 
expected to be negative.  The three dummy variables representing a company’s participation in a 
business group would be negatively correlated with the company’s choice of the corporate form of 
a closed JSC, whereas GROSIZ would have a positive sign.    PRICOM and SPIOFF, both of which 
reflect the impact of past policies on company start-ups, would be negative.  COMSIZ is also 
                                                        
17  Hence, newly established private firms after the collapse of the Soviet Union are treated as the 
reference in our estimation.   15
expected to be negative; this is because the larger the size of a company is, the more shareholders 
and the more capital the company has, and the requirements for choosing the corporate form of an 
open JSC are thus gradually fulfilled. 
Table 4 compares open and closed JSCs using the above independent variables.    Open JSCs, 
regardless of their type, have a higher average outside ownership than closed JSCs, and the 
difference between the two forms of incorporation in this regard is statistically significant at the 5% 
or less significance level for all types of non-managerial shareholders.    In contrast, the percentage 
of companies with large numbers of management shareholders in all samples of closed JSCs is 15% 
higher than that of open JSCs, and the difference between them is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  Furthermore, the differences between open and closed JSCs regarding the proportion of 
companies having a long-term credit relationship with a specific commercial bank, the proportion 
of privatized firms, and the average number of employees are also statistically significant and 
consistent with our theoretical hypotheses.    The remaining variables need to be reexamined using 
a regression analysis technique, since their statistical significance was not detected by simply 
comparing the descriptive statistics. 
The basic sample for our estimation consists of 557 observations, excluding all stock 
companies that have already issued securities in the past (Sample type I).    In order to validate the 
robustness of the estimation results, a supplementary estimation is performed using the following 
three cases: Sample type II, which is made up of the firms included in Sample type I excluding all 
communications firms; Sample type III, which excludes firms whose number of employees exceeds 
the mean of the number of employees of the closed JSCs plus/minus 1 standard deviation from the 
basic sample set; and Sample type IV, which consists of firms with a stable ownership structure that 
did not experience changes in major shareholders from 2001 to 2004.  An estimation using the 
former two cases focuses on the estimation bias arising from the characteristics of newly emerged 
telecommunication businesses and those of mega corporations.    On the other hand, the estimation 
using Sample type IV deals with the possible endogeneity relating to corporate forms and 
ownership structures.  As an alternative way to deal with the endogeneity of two elements, we 
also conducted a two-stage probit estimation
18 by introducing the following four variables to be 
utilized as additional instruments together with all exogenous variables in the right-hand side on 
the first stage of regression: a dummy variable of shareholding by an incumbent CEO (or president) 
(CEOSHA); a dummy variable that is assigned a value of 1 if there is a shareholder or a shareholder 
group that substantially controls corporate management (DOMSHA); the age level of the CEO or 
company president (CEOAGE); and a three-point-scale assessment of the intensity of competition 
with domestic firms in a product market (COMDOM).
19    The White’s estimator of 
heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors is used for various statistical tests. 
                                                        
18  The two-stage procedure would be to estimate the reduced forms for ownership variables by probit 
or ordered probit maximum likelihood and estimate the corporate-form choice model by probit after 
substituting the predicted values for ownership variables.    For more details regarding the two-stage 
estimation methods, see Maddala (1983), Newey (1987), and Rivers and Vuong (1988). 
19  The correlation coefficients for CLOCOM and each of the newly introduced 4 variables range 
between -0.032 and 0.019 and are statistically insignificant.   16
The following is the basic equation of our regression, and the marks in parentheses stand for 
the expected signs: 
Pr[CLOCOM=1] = F(constant,  OUTOWN(-),  MANSHA(?),  SECPLA(-),  RELBAN(-), 
NUMFIN(-),  GROFIR(-),  GROSIZ(+),  PRICOM(-),  SPIOFF(-),  COMSIZ(-),  industry 
dummies) 
Table 5 shows the estimation results.
20  The coefficients of the independent variables 
represent their marginal effects. 
Except for the variables representing ownership by financial institutions including commercial 
banks and foreign ownership, all of the explanatory variables for Models 1 through 4 estimated 
using the basic sample have the predicted signs with high statistical significance.
21  The  presence 
of non-managerial shareholders diminishes the probability that an investment-target firm will 
become a closed JSC.  Another interesting aspect is that the marginal effect of state involvement 
is much stronger than the influence of private owners.  The impact of capital demand and the 
development of local financial institutions also reduce the probability of the choice of closed JSCs.   
Companies linked with a business group through ownership tend to choose to become open JSCs.  
However, the larger a business group becomes, the higher the number of closed companies that are 
included among its member firms.    Privatized firms are more likely to be open companies, as are 
JSCs spun off from state-owned or municipal enterprises or from other privatized companies.  In 
addition, as the size of a company grows, the likelihood of the company operating as a closed JSC 
significantly decreases. 
On the other hand, the result that a large management shareholder dummy (MANSHA) is 
significant and positive illustrates a special characteristic of the Russian economy.  This implies 
that Russian managers place far more importance on maintaining effective control of their 
company than on obtaining capital gains by having stock in their companies.  Furthermore, it 
suggests that they have a strong desire to prevent outside intervention by their company 
management and discipline by shareholders, even at the cost of a somewhat reduced value and 
lowered transferability of their own shares.
22  In other words, as suggested by agency theorists 
who elucidate the behavioral pattern of company executives in the developed countries, the 
inclination toward managerial entrenchment is also significant among Russian managers.   
Furthermore, this result clearly demonstrates that the most attractive reason for Russian managers 
                                                        
20  The correlation coefficients for the independent variables used in each model are well below a 
threshold of 0.70 for possible multicollinearity in all combinations (Lind et al. 2004). 
21  The non-significance of ownership by financial institutions and foreign ownership is consistent with 
the statements pointed out by many researchers pertaining to the passive attitude of commercial 
banks and investment funds as institutional investors, the weak presence of foreign shareholders, and 
the widespread share purchases by managers and their affiliates through offshore companies 
(Iwasaki 2007b).   
22 This is closely associated with the fact that the sample firms used for the empirical analysis in this 
section as well as the overwhelming majority of Russian companies are unlisted and have stock 
prices that are not particularly sensitive to management performance, which leads to an extremely 
low incentive effect of stock ownership by managers.   17
to operate their firms as closed JSCs is the variety of fringe benefits they obtain by doing so.  
Even at the time of the joint survey, which was 14 years after the systemic transformation to a 
market economy, it was highly likely that many corporate executives still held such perceptions, 
given the underdeveloped capital and managerial markets in the Russian economy. 
It is logical that the SECPLA for Models 5 and 6 is slightly less significant than that for the 
other models since the sample set does not include any communications companies,
23 which 
represent the emerging industry in Russia, or the largest corporations, which have substantial 
financial needs and are highly motivated to raise equity capital.  It is not surprising that the 
GROFIR and GROSIZ for Model 7 are insignificant, considering that an impressive 46.4% of the 
surveyed firms (110 of 237) that experienced a substantial change in their ownership structure from 
2001 to 2004 were almost group firms.  What is more important from the viewpoint of the 
statistical robustness of the estimation results is that the explanatory power and significance of the 
ownership variables in Model 7 are almost at the same level as those of the estimates for Model 1.
24  
In addition, the result of a two-stage probit estimation of Model 8 also strongly suggests that there 
is an empirical relation between the corporate form and the ownership structure even if we assume 
that both of them are determined endogenously. 
To sum up, our empirical evidence supports that the five organizational-choice mechanisms 
stated in Subsection 4.1 are effectively functioning in the real world.  There are four primary 
economic problems that cause many JSCs to choose the corporate form of a closed company in 
Russia: (a) a concentrated insider ownership structure, (b) persistent orientation towards 
organizational closedness among corporate officers, (c) sluggish capital demand in the corporate 
sector, and (d) an underdeveloped regional financial sector.  In contrast, corporatization through 
state asset privatization and the formation of business groups positively affect the choice of an open 
company.    These findings strongly suggest that the peculiarities of the transition economy and the 
massive presence of closed JSCs are inseparably linked in Russia. 
 
5. Institutional Complementarity between the Corporate Form and the Internal 
Organizational Structure 
Choosing which corporate form to adopt is an important step for a JSC in order to determine 
its organizational openness and one that greatly affects the relationship between its managers and 
shareholders.  However, this is not the only step required.  Its objective is fulfilled when the 
company has finalized its internal organizational structure by, for example, drawing up a corporate 
charter and electing the corporate bodies required by law.    This section further examines corporate 
form issues by focusing on the institutional complementarity between the corporate form and the 
                                                        
23 In fact, the Russian communication sector, which has been developing in recent years at a 
breathtaking speed, driven by cellular phone and Internet service businesses, saw an average annual 
real growth rate of 22.4% between 2001 and 2004.  This growth is much higher than the 4.2% for 
the eight manufacturing sectors covered by our enterprise survey and is the reason that the 
telecommunication sector is regarded as the new economy in Russia. 
24  On the other hand, all models were re-estimated by logit, and the results were found to be almost the 
same as those indicated in Table 5.   18
internal organizational structure. 
5.1. A New Approach to Institutional Complementarity: Function-enhancing Complementarity 
versus Function-neutralizing Complementarity 
A general perception by economists of the concept of institutional complementarity is 
represented in the following statement by Aoki (2000, pp. 57-8): 
“If the institutional structure of a particular economy reflects equilibrium strategies in its 
underlying evolutionary game, complementarity is likely to exist between the elements of that 
structure. That is, the operations of one institution will be reinforced by the existence of other 
institutions. This is referred to as “institutional complementarity,”…” (emphasis added). 
The concept of institutional complementarity not only refers to the institutional compatibility 
in a particular economic system but also implies a positive assessment of the synergistic effects of 
different institutions functionally enhancing one another.
25    Nevertheless, we emphasize that such 
complementarity may exist in a way that causes one institution to functionally undermine the other. 
This means that even if the functional level of an institution were excessive for a particular 
economic entity, it would be impossible to fine-tune that institution, and another institution would 
work to inhibit the function of others in order to optimize the entire system.  If an institutional 
complementarity that causes institution Ψ
+ to reinforce the function of institution Ω
+ or causes both 
of these institutions to functionally enhance each other can be called a “function-enhancing 
complementarity” and an institutional arrangement that is established based on such institutional 
complementarity and represented in a matrix form as (Ω
+,  Ψ
+) may be referred to as a 
“function-enhancing complementarity equilibrium,” then an institutional complementarity that 
causes institution Ψ
- to work to offset or mitigate the function of institution Ω
+ or causes these two 
institutions to functionally neutralize each other may be called a “function-neutralizing 
complementarity,” and an institutional arrangement based on this (Ω
+, Ψ
-) may be referred to as a 
“function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium.” 
A function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium tends to be achieved when institution Ω
+ 
is exogenous to a given economic entity or when it is still under development in its evolutional 
process.  If institution Ω
+ transforms into Ω
++ with the desired functional level by becoming 
endogenous to a given economic entity or gaining perfection over time, it is presumed that there is 
                                                        
25 One good example for understanding this notion is the Japanese corporate system, which is 
characterized by an insider-centered career system, cross-shareholding practices between a company 
and its clients or financial institutions, the main bank system, the Japanese-style employment system 
featuring long-term (lifetime) employment, a seniority-based pay scale, and an in-house union 
(Miyamoto 2004).  The governance mechanism in Japanese firms is referred to as the “contingent 
governance system” formulated by Aoki (2000), in which a systematic transfer of management 
control over a company from insiders (top managers promoted from within employee groups) to 
outsiders (main banks) takes place, depending on the management performance and financial 
situations.    The concept of institutional complementarity is believed to account for the fact that the 
Japanese economic system is more reasonable than its counterparts in the US and European 
countries, which has significantly contributed to overcoming the stereotype of Japan as a country 
with a unique but eccentric economic system. 
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also a change in institution Ψ
-, leading to the emergence of a new, non-function-neutralizing 
complementarity equilibrium expressed as (Ω
++, Ψ
++).  In this sense, an institutional arrangement 
with function-neutralizing complementarity characteristics generates only a short-term equilibrium.   
As seen in the relationship between law and business, however, the wider the social hierarchy is 
between a particular economic entity (enterprise) and an institutional builder (legislative body) for 
institution Ω
+, the more difficult it is for the former to achieve long-term equilibrium. Therefore, a 
function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium exists for a substantial period of time in the real 
incomplete world, even though it is theoretically transient.  With this in mind, the impact of a 
function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium on the economic performance under assessment 
cannot be disregarded. 
As is probably quite evident, this paper provides a good opportunity for an empirical study of 
the two examples of institutional complementarity, making it possible to observe both the 
function-enhancing and function-neutralizing aspects of institutional complementarity by looking 
at various combinations of corporate forms and internal organizational structures.  The 
dichotomous options of statutory corporate form enforced by the Russian corporate law, i.e., the 
choice between an open and a closed company, are probably not satisfactory to the JSCs, whose 
ownership structures and business environments are diverse.  This is because the ideal degree of 
organizational openness differs from company to company.    In addition, it is quite unlikely that an 
enterprise can solve conflicts of interests between shareholders and company managers solely by 
determining its legal form of incorporation. 
For instance, some investors in closed JSCs may persistently complain that the restrictions on 
share transferability imposed by the Law on JSCs unreasonably increase a company’s 
organizational closedness, which can potentially hamper effective monitoring of top management.  
On the other hand, some open JSC managers, fearing governmental intervention into their 
companies and hostile takeovers, may continue to feel cautious about the statutory rights of 
shareholders to freely transfer shares as well as about the disclosure requirements due to the 
possible risk of the company being excessively exposed to the outside environment.  Of course, 
there also may be shareholders and managers who regard the institutional effect of the corporate 
form they have chosen as insufficient.  These people try to affect the functional strength of their 
companies’ corporate forms and further achieve more adequate organizational openness for their 
own benefit by amending their corporate charters to include their original provisions on share 
transfers and by exercising their influence over the decision-making process to determine the 
number of members, composition, and rules of internal corporate organs. 
In the case described above, open (closed) JSCs are regarded to have attained a 
function-enhancing complementarity arrangement by coordinating the organizational openness 
(closedness) of their internal structures.  Conversely, enterprises that chose an open (closed) JSC 
as their corporate form and adjusted their internal structures to have closed (open) characteristics 
are considered to have selected a function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium as their 
institutional arrangement.  By applying the above criteria to our firm-level data, we use the next 
subsection to describe the actual behavior of Russian corporations in this respect.   20
5.2. Institutional Arrangement of the Corporate Form and Internal Structure in Russian Firms 
The internal structure of a stock company is quite complex.    Hence, the following analysis of 
the joint survey results was carried out in order to measure the organizational openness of the 
internal structure as a whole of each surveyed firm.  Hayashi’s quantification method III
26 was 
used for 24 qualitative variables (categorical data) collected from 553 firms, representing the 
characteristics of a statutory corporate structure in terms of the content of a corporate charter 
regarding shareholders’ ownership and their voting rights, general shareholders’ meetings, board of 
directors, collective executive organs,
27 audit committees (auditors), and external auditors.  This 
was done to obtain sample scores of the second eigenvalues that best represent the organizational 
openness of a company’s internal structure. 
The variables used in the analysis are listed in Table 6.    These variables contain information 
about the existence of corporate charter provisions that limit the number of shares owned per 
shareholder or restrict shareholder voting rights, as well as about the composition of its 
membership, frequency of meetings, and authority of corporate organizations over management 
decisions.    In this table, the response rate of these variables for each corporate form is also shown.   
The χ
2 test of differences of proportions revealed that the difference between open and closed JSCs 
was statistically significant for 16 of the 24 categories.    As expected, these figures clearly suggest 
that closed JSCs generally have a more closed internal structure than open stock companies. 
The sample scores calculated on the basis of the categorical quantity of the second eigenvalue 
listed at the far right of Table 6 are hereinafter referred to as openness scores (OPESCO), which are 
used as indices to quantify the openness of the internal organizational structure.    OPESCO ranges 
from -2.910 to 2.020, and its mean (median) is -0.093 (-0.052).    The mean (median) OPESCO for 
open JSCs is 0.045 (0.023), that for closed JSCs is -0.472 (-0.510), and the difference of the means 
between these two company groups is significant at the 1% level (t=5.180, p=0.000; Wilcoxon Z 
=4.896, p=0.000).  Hence, there is a substantial, statistically significant difference between open 
and closed companies in terms of the openness of their internal structures. 
The determinants of the openness of an internal structure of a company may overlap with the 
factors affecting its choice of corporate form discussed in Subsection 4.2.  In particular, the 
bargaining power of shareholders and top executives over management, as well as the company’s 
membership in a business group, are expected to have a significant impact on the openness of an 
internal structure, since the mode of the internal organizational structure is directly related to how 
                                                        
26  Quantification method III uses structural description models, as do the principal component analysis 
and factor analysis methods.  However, it analyzes the categorical data expressed as {0, 1} rather 
than the continuous (quantitative) variable. 
27  A collective executive organ headed by the company president (the general director), which is an 
internal executive organization voluntarily set up by a company, “takes leadership in daily corporate 
management except for exclusive competence of the general shareholder meeting and the board of 
directors” (Article 69(2) of the law on JSCs).  In addition, Article 66(2) of that law prohibits 
members of a collective executive organ from making up more than one-quarter of the board of 
directors.  In view of these provisions, it is assumed that the presence of a collective executive 
organ functions to clarify management responsibilities and to enhance the independence of the board 
of directors from management (Iwasaki 2007a).   21
the company divides its managerial control.    As we argued in Section 3, because the formation of 
an open organizational architecture enables company managers to demonstrate a more transparent 
management style to business partners and potential investors, a firm’s demand in fundraising may 
be positively related to the openness of its internal structure. 
To verify the presumptions presented above, we conducted an OLS estimation to regress 
OPESCO on the variables representing ownership share by shareholders and managers, the proxy 
variables of capital demand and supply constraints, and a group company dummy, while 
controlling the impact of past policies on company start-ups and the size and sector of the 
company.
28  Table 7 shows the results.
29  It indicates that (a) ownership by shareholders and 
managers adversely affects the formation of a company’s internal structure; (b) membership in a 
business group increases the openness of the internal structure of its member firms against the 
background that the holding company and core group companies try to secure effective monitoring 
and corporate governance in affiliated companies; and (c) the significantly estimated RELBAN has 
a positive sign corresponding to the theoretical assumption of constraints on capital supply and 
demand.    These results imply that there are many common factors that have the same direction of 
impact both on the choice of corporate form and the formation of the internal structure.  These 
elements appear as driving forces to promote the coevolution and function-enhancing institutional 
arrangements of a company’s legal form of incorporation and its internal organizational structure. 
Meanwhile, the following interesting fact was discovered by looking at OPESCO from a 
different angle.  As referred to in Section 3, the respondents were asked whether or not they 
believed that the corporate form of their company was beneficial to the growth of their business.  
When comparing the OPESCO values for companies that answered “beneficial” with those of the 
companies that answered “detrimental,” the sample group of open JSCs had a mean/median ratio of 
0.033/0.150 (265 firms) to -0.090/0.010 (43 firms), whereas that for the sample group of closed 
JSCs was -0.606/-0.609 (97 firms) to 0.095/0.115 (14 firms), suggesting that JSCs whose managers 
have a negative view of their own corporate form are inclined to develop an internal structure with 
function-neutralizing characteristics.  In particular, the difference between closed JSCs with a 
positive view and closed JSCs with a negative view is statistically quite significant (t=2.217, 
p=0.029; Wilcoxon Z =2.070, p=0.039).
30    In other words, closed companies that are not satisfied 
with their closed disposition in terms of the corporate form are much more likely to achieve 
function-neutralizing complementarity institutional arrangements than open companies.  This 
suggests the possibility that dissatisfaction with the corporate form of a closed JSC comes from its 
closed organizational nature, represented by severe restrictions on share transferability imposed by 
the Russian corporate law. 
As is clear from the above examination, the distribution of OPESCO for open and closed JSCs 
                                                        
28  The basic sample for the OLS estimation consists of 417 observations.  Sample constraints are 
provided in accordance with the corporate-form choice models. 
29  All correlation coefficients between the independent variables used in these models are smaller than 
a threshold of 0.7, and the variance inflation factor for each of the independent variables is well 
under a threshold of 10.0 (mean = 2.347). 
30  The result of the same test for open companies is: t=-0.752, p=0.452; Wilcoxon Z =-0.556, p=0.578.   22
is diverse, and there is a general tendency for open companies to try to make their internal 
structures more open to the outside world and for closed companies to act in the reverse.    Hence, 
looking at the overall picture of the current state of Russian JSCs, their dynamic and systematic 
efforts to attain a function-enhancing complementarity equilibrium for their internal structures are 
noticeable.  However, as indicated by the frequency distribution charts in Figure 1, there are 
many open JSCs that have internal structures with openness levels that are the same or lower than 
the average internal structures in closed JSCs.    At the same time, there is a significant number of 
closed JSCs with open internal structures.  In fact, when categorizing the surveyed firms into 
companies with open internal structures and companies with closed internal structures on the basis 
of whether or not their OPESCO values are larger than the median of all samples, 43.3% of the 
responding open JSCs (176 firms out of 406) have closed internal structures, whereas 32.0% of the 
responding closed JSCs (47 firms out of 147) have open structures; that is, according to the 
discussions in Section 4, four of ten of the firms surveyed have already achieved or are in the 
process of achieving a function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium as the institutional 
arrangement for the internal governance system. 
 
6. Institutional Equilibrium and Organizational Behavior 
As noted in the previous section, an asymmetrical institutional arrangement between a 
corporate form and its internal structure is a noticeable phenomenon that divides medium-sized and 
large JSCs, which are a core component of the Russian business sector, into two types.    Therefore, 
as long as the qualitative differences in an institutional equilibrium affect corporate governance and 
firm performance in these companies to a certain degree, that fact may be of great significance not 
only to their businesses but also to the Russian economy as a whole.    In this section, this issue will 
be closely examined. 
6.1. Testable Hypotheses 
The theoretical study of institutional diversity and imperfect institutions has made remarkable 
progress in recent years (Young 1998; Aoki 2001; Eggertsson 2005; Ostrom 2005).  Although 
such research lacks precision in assessing how an institutional equilibrium affects the behavioral 
pattern of an economic entity, including a corporation, it provides highly suggestive clues to 
elucidating this mechanism.  The organizational economics also gives helpful hints on this topic.  
Based on recent developments of institutional and organizational studies in economics, we propose 
three testable hypotheses with regard to the possible impact of institutional arrangements of 
corporate forms and internal structures of Russian stock companies on corporate governance and 
firm performance. 
First, the institutional arrangement of corporate form and internal organizational structure in a 
stock company may be closely linked with the probability of the occurrence of infighting between 
management and shareholders.    An institutional equilibrium in a corporate organization, which is 
reached as a result of a bargaining game between managers and owners over corporate control, 
brings a degree of stability to the company management but does not prevent all conflicts of   23
interest between the two parties stemming from changes in the outer environment and opportunistic 
behavior of the corporate executives.  The probability of such a disagreement on company 
management between the managers and the shareholders developing into serious infighting largely 
depends on the degree of freedom that shareholders have to voice their opinions to the management 
and exit ownership.    Accordingly, we hypothesize that the more institutionally open a company is, 
the more effective it will be at reducing the risk of internal conflict between shareholders and 
management. 
Secondly, in terms of the marginal effect to restrain infighting between shareholders and 
company executives, function-neutralizing complementarity between the corporate form and the 
internal structure is inferior to function-enhancing complementarity as institutional coordination.  
The reasons for the relatively low degree of the marginal functional strength of a 
function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium are that no synergetic effects between 
functionally compatible institutions can be expected and that systemic distortion (coordination 
loss) may occur by coupling function-incompatible institutions.  Hence, we assume that 
function-neutralizing complementarity between corporate forms and internal structures is inferior 
to function-enhancing complementarity in the sense that the additional openness of the internal 
organizational structure in closed JSCs may be less effective at deterring internal conflicts between 
corporate managers and shareholders than that in open companies, all else being equal. 
Finally, the institutional equilibrium of corporate form and internal structure in a JSC has only an 
indirect impact on its productivity as well as on its investment and restructuring activities.    There 
are two rationales for this discussion.    First, although it is true that the institutional coordination of 
corporate form and internal structures plays a significant role in disciplining corporate officers and 
ensuring organizational stabilization, it is equally true that firm performance in Russia is also 
largely affected by the business environment, the quality of its managers, the labor-management 
relationships, the financial constraints, and the interrelationships with business partners and the 
state.  Particularly, in transitional Russia, corporate management is seriously crippled by 
hardening budget constraints due to the uncertain political and economic situation and 
underdeveloped capital market and banking system.  Therefore, it is quite possible that these 
factors have a more definitive impact on the performance of the corporate management of Russian 
firms in comparison with the potential impact of the institutional equilibrium of corporate form and 
internal structure. 
The second rationale, although not as realistic as the first one, is that many Russian firms 
determine their organizational arrangements for the purpose of optimizing their performance.    As 
reported in Section 3, most of the managers of the surveyed firms replied that the current corporate 
form, whether an open or a closed JSC, was more beneficial to the development of their companies 
than the alternative form.  This may suggest that many of the surveyed firms chose the corporate 
form most appropriate for the pursuit of firm performance.  If the same logic is applicable to the 
formation of internal corporate structures and to the institutional arrangements of a company as a 
whole, there are no statistically significant correlations among firm performance and its corporate 
form, its internal structure, and the institutional equilibrium of the two.    Based on either of the two   24
rationales discussed above, we hypothesize that it appears to be difficult to find a significant 
empirical relationship between the institutional equilibrium of corporate form and internal 
structure in a Russian stock company and firm performance. 
6.2. Impact of Institutional Equilibrium on Corporate Governance 
To substantiate the first and second hypothesis presented above, we perform a probit 
estimation of qualitative choice models using the following two dependent variables.  One is an 
internal-conflict dummy variable (INTCON), which is assigned a value of 1 if the company has 
experienced harsh infighting between managers and shareholders at least once from 2001 to 2004. 
“Infighting between managers and shareholders,” as reported here, refers to a situation in which the 
conflict was brought to the court’s attention as a criminal or civil case or which became a scandal 
attracting local and national media coverage.   The other dependent variable is a 
CEO-displacement dummy (CEOTUR), in which a value of 1 is assigned to companies that saw 
CEO turnover at the request of shareholders at least once during the same period.  According to 
the survey results, 206 (26.8%) of the 768 firms had more than one internal conflict, and 170 
(20.7%) of the 821 firms changed their top management as a result of pressure from their 
shareholders.    Karpoff and Rice (1989) regard managerial turnover as a proxy variable to measure 
the magnitude of a control contest or shareholder disagreement.    Our CEOTUR variable may have 
the same function.  However, managerial turnovers in Russia are generally regarded as an 
arbitration process applied to reduce conflict between managers and shareholders and reach 
settlements outside of courts.  In fact, of the 158 surveyed firms that answered they had a CEO 
displacement from 2001 to 2004, only 53 companies (33.5%) reported that they also experienced 
an internal conflict in the same period.  In other words, companies that can attain a CEO 
displacement relatively easily are able to settle conflicts effectively between managers and 
shareholders as to the reported CEO displacement.  Consequently, these companies may prevent 
themselves from getting involved in a grave scandal attracting the attention of the court and mass 
media.  Therefore,  we  predict  that  a corporate organization open to non-managerial shareholders 
deters internal conflicts between shareholders and management and increases the likelihood of 
shareholder-initiated CEO turnovers, all else being equal. 
To examine the impact of corporate form and internal structure in a JSC and the impact of the 
institutional arrangement on the probability of such organizational behavior, we estimated probit 
models aimed at verifying the individual effects of the corporate form and internal structure as well 
as the synergistic effects generated by the institutional coordination of these two elements.  The 
individual effects of the corporate form and internal structure were estimated using the following 
equation, which takes an open JSC dummy (OPECOM) and OPESCO as the explanatory variables 
together with the variables controlling ownership structure (OWNOUT, MANSHA), the relationship 
with business groups (GROFIR), the gross sales change from 2001 to 2004 (SALGRO), which 
represents the management condition in that period, and the size and sector of the given surveyed 
firm (COMSIZ and industry dummy variables): 
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Pr[INTCON=1 or CEOTUR=1] = F(constant, OPECOM, OPESCO, OWNOUT, MANSHA, 
GROFIR, SALGRO, COMSIZ, industry dummies) 
On the other hand, the synergistic effect of the institutional coordination of a corporate form 
and an internal structure is estimated on the basis of two sub-samples representing open and closed 
JSCs using the above formula but without the OPECOM variable.    In consideration of the possible 
reverse-causality, in which an internal conflict or CEO turnover that occurred in the past may 
directly or indirectly affect the current state of the governance system, the empirical analysis in this 
subsection is limited to the firms that did not experience changes in major shareholders from 2001 
to 2004, that is, companies whose ownership structure remained almost constant during that period.   
This sample constraint is considered to be quite effective in ruling out the possibility of the 
aforementioned reverse-causality, since it is a well-known fact that almost all large-scale internal 
structural changes in Russian firms are triggered by a shift in dominant shareholders resulting from 
a hostile takeover or merger. 
Table 8 shows the results from univariate analysis.  Both the χ
2-test of the difference of the 
proportion and the nonparametric Wilcoxon rank-sum test confirmed that there is a statistically 
significant difference between open and closed JSCs in terms of the probability of 
shareholder-initiated CEO turnover at the 5% level.  On the other hand, the difference between 
two company groups divided on the basis of the median value of OPESCO is significant both at the 
10% level in terms of the probability of an internal conflict between shareholders and company 
executives as well as at the 1% level with regard to the probability of CEO turnover. 
The results from multivariate regression analysis are summarized in Table 9.
31  These 
models highlight the analytical importance of institutional coordination of corporate organization 
and the outstanding effect of the function-enhancing institutional complementarity in a clearer 
fashion than we expected.    The corporate form alone does not have any significant impact on the 
probability of an internal conflict or a CEO turnover.    Moreover, the internal structure alone does 
not effectively deter internal conflicts.  On the contrary, an increase in the openness of an open 
company’s internal structure positively affects the prevention of corporate infighting and expansion 
of shareholders’ influence over the managerial selection process, and its magnitude and statistical 
significance are larger than those for an internal structure’s individual effects.
32  In contrast, a 
closed company’s attempts to design a more open internal structure yield no statistically significant 
result.  Here, it is strongly suggested that the function-enhancing complementarity between 
corporate form and internal organizational structure in a JSC can produce considerable synergistic 
effects and, conversely, that the function-neutralizing institutional complementarity may be 
                                                        
31  Again, all of the correlation coefficients among the independent variables used in these models were 
below a threshold of 0.70.    In addition, all models were re-estimated by logit and yielded the same 
results as those shown in Table 9. 
32  To check the robustness of these estimation results, we also conducted the estimation based on more 
constrained observations by excluding all the communications firms from the basic sample as well as 
the largest companies, as we did for the estimation of the corporate-form choice model in Subsection 
4.2, and we found that there is no remarkable change in the coefficients and statistical significance of 
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accompanied by a serious coordination loss to corporate management. 
On the other hand, in the light of empirical evidence on the corporate governance of Russian 
firms, it is quite suggestive that OWNOUT has a positive sign with statistical significance in many 
cases and that MANSHA is negative and significant in Models 4 and 5 using CEOTUR as the 
dependent variable.
33  Furthermore, the result that SALGRO is not significant as the explanatory 
variable for the probability of an internal conflict and CEO turnover except for Model 3 is 
consistent with those of preceding studies, in which it was repeatedly maintained that the 
managerial turnover in Russian firms was not sensitive to their performance (Iwasaki 2007b).
34  
Hence, it is possible that, in Russia, corporate infighting and CEO turnover need to be seen in the 
context of power struggles between managers and outside investors rather than in the context of 
shareholders’ complaints blaming managers for poor performance or company scandals. 
6.3. Impact of Institutional Equilibrium on Firm Performance 
The third hypothesis regarding the causality between institutional equilibrium and firm 
performance is supported by the survey results.  Table 10 shows the results from univariate 
comparative analysis of two sample groups classified by corporate form and by the degree of 
openness of their internal structure on the basis of a total of 13 criteria.  Six of them, including 
labor productivity and changes in gross sales, are related to business performance for the past 
several years.  The remaining seven, including the intensiveness of investment activities and 
changes in R&D expenditure, reflect restructuring activities. 
In each of these two types of comparisons, no significant difference is observed in more than 
half of the criteria.  In addition, the statistical differences found in the remaining criteria do not 
necessarily demonstrate an advantage of an open JSC over a closed JSC nor do they suggest any 
advantage of an open internal structure over a closed one and vice versa.    In addition, none of the 
regression analyses conducted with these performance indices as the dependent variables produced 
systematically significant results with respect to the corporate-form dummy variable (OPESCO) 
and the interaction term of these variables.
35  The empirical results indicate that an institutional 
equilibrium between corporate form and internal organizational structure in a Russian JSC is less 
likely to have a direct impact on firm performance. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In Russia, an overwhelming number of JSCs choose to become closed companies despite the 
fact that this corporate form strays far from the primary nature of stock companies, that is, an 
economic mechanism intended to raise capital from a wide range of private investors and increase 
                                                        
33  We re-estimated all models in Table 9, excluding ownership variables from the independent variables, 
and confirmed that this treatment did not have any influence on OPECOM and OPESCO.   
34 In  place  of  SALGRO, the probit estimation was also performed using variables for a company’s labor 
productivity, its financial and economic condition as assessed by its managers, and dividend 
distribution frequency as a proxy for firm performance, none of which produced significant results. 
35  In almost all of these regression results, the explanatory variables representing the relationship with 
a business group, the company size, and the financial constraints on corporate management were 
estimated with high statistical significance.    This also supports the third hypothesis.   27
shareholder wealth as effectively as possible.    This trend is equally obvious for medium-sized and 
large enterprises in the manufacturing and communications sectors.    In this study, we attempted to 
conduct theoretical and empirical examinations on this quite interesting economic phenomenon 
using the results of a Japan-Russia large-scale joint enterprise survey in the 64 federal regions in 
the first half of 2005. 
In the first part of this paper, we illustrated the mechanism behind the organizational choice 
between two alternative corporate forms and identified the following four factors that encourage 
many Russian firms to be closed: (a) a widespread insider-dominating corporate ownership 
structure emerging as a result of the mass-privatization policy; (b) a strong orientation among 
managers toward closed corporate organization due to the underdeveloped capital and managerial 
markets; (c) slumping needs for corporate finance; and (d) insufficient financial support from local 
financial institutions.  The empirical relation between ownership structure and corporate form 
does exist even if the endogeneity of the two elements is assumed.  The fact that the above four 
factors still have a significant impact on the behavioral patterns of Russian corporations even after 
well over a decade since the collapse of the Soviet Union is a reminder of the difficult and 
time-consuming transition process from a centrally planned to a market-based economic system.  
We also found that, in addition to the four determinates outlined above, the historical 
path-dependency of the enterprise privatization in the early 1990s and the intense formation of 
business groups, both of which represent peculiarities of the transforming Russian economy, have a 
significant impact on the choice of corporate form by Russian firms. 
In the latter half of this paper, we examine the institutional coordination between corporate 
forms and internal organizational structures in Russian stock companies and their effect on 
corporate governance and firm performance.  The provisions of the law on JSCs force Russian 
firms to choose between an open or a closed JSC as their legal form of incorporation, resulting in 
the emergence of the two contrasting types of institutional equilibrium.  The reason that some 
Russian enterprises try to add a reverse-functional aspect to their internal structures needs to be 
understood in the context of their economically rational organizational behavior to adjust the 
excessive functional strengths of their corporate form, which are exogenous to them.  Such an 
organizational reaction of Russian firms to corporate law probably plays an important role in 
enabling them to perform stable business operations on a “peace” footing.  According to the 
empirical evidence derived in the previous section, however, compared with a function-enhancing 
complementarity equilibrium coupling functionally compatible institutions, the 
function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium works quite ineffectively in preventing serious 
internal conflicts between shareholders and company managers as well as in allowing shareholders 
to dismiss managers, both of which are critical challenges facing corporate governance in Russia 
today. 
Now Russia is required to build a legal framework that can eliminate the need for enterprises 
to maintain the inefficient institutional equilibrium of corporate organization.  Yet it will be 
difficult to achieve this objective in a way that will force all JSCs to become open companies, as 
has been proposed by the lower house of the Federal Assembly (The State Duma) and is currently   28
being discussed within the federal government (Osipenko 2005).
36  The most essential policy 
solution is to facilitate an environment that motivates Russian firms to voluntarily unlock their 
organizations.  Without this condition, the convergence policy of the corporate forms into open 
JSCs may drive more companies towards a function-neutralizing complementarity equilibrium.  
After all, the sound development of the Russian business sector can be achieved only by promoting 
the transition to a market economy in parallel with an effort to move forward with appropriate and 
comprehensive structural reforms.    There is no shortcut to this process. 
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Share transferability No restrictions are imposed on share transfers.  No preferred
purchase rights may be arranged for any shareholders,
including the company, with regard to the transfer of shares to
third parties (Art. 7(2)).
The company shareholders have the right to purchase the
shares of other shareholders in preference to third parties.
The company may only exercise such a preferred purchase
right when no shareholder elects to do so (Art. 7(3)).
Share subscription Open JSCs are incorporated by having all of their shares
subscribed by their promoters or by having some of their
shares subscribed by their promoters, and the remaining
shares subscribed by other investors (Art. 7(2)).  After
incorporation, they can make a public share placement
without any restriction (Art. 39(1) & Art. 39(2)).
Closed JSCs are incorporated only by having all of their
shares subscribed by their promoters.  All of their shares
issued after their incorporation must be offered only to their




Open JSCs may issue any kind of bonds (including
convertible bonds) to the public in accordance with the
procedures set by law (Art. 39(2)).
Closed JSCs are prohibited from issuing convertible bonds to
the public (Art. 39(2)).
Statutory minimum
capitalization requirement
1000 times the minimum statutory wage on the date of
registration (Art. 26).
100 times the minimum statutory wage on the date of
registration (Art. 26).
Number of shareholders No upper limit is placed on the number of shareholders (Art.
7(2)).
The upper limit on the number of shareholders is 50 (Art.
7(3)).  However, this limit does not apply to closed JSCs
established by the end of 1995 (Art. 94(4)).
State involvement in
investment
The state may not become the promoter of a joint-stock
company, in principle (Art. 10(1)).  However, state agencies
may become the promoters of open JSCs in certain cases as
provided for by law (Art. 7(4)).
Only former state-owned enterprises and other former
municipal enterprises may become the promoters of closed
JSCs (Art. 7(4)).
Disclosure requirements Open JSCs are required to disclose certain information as
requested by the law on JSCs and other statutes and by
government agencies (Art. 92(1)).
Closed JSCs that issue bonds or securities at the same price
and in the same manner as instructed by the Federal Financial
Markets Service (FFMS) are required to disclose certain
information in accordance with the rules adopted by the
FFMS (Art. 92(2)).
Differences in the Legal Framework between Open and Closed Joint-Stock Companies in Russia
Table 1
Note. This table shows the differences in legal frameworkｓ of open and closed joint stock companies according to the Civil Code and the Federal Law on Joint-Stock












(a) Advantages of open JSCs over closed JSCs 
a
Company transparency can be emphasized to business partners and investors. 235 31.2 202 38.3 33 14.6
Corporate governance can be improved. 85 11.3 60 11.4 25 11.1
Better access to financial markets and increased ability to attract potential investors 160 21.2 97 18.4 63 27.9
Shareholders may sell stocks freely. 96 12.7 67 12.7 29 12.8
Others 2 0.3 2 0.4 0 0.0
There is no comparative advantage. 175 23.2 99 18.8 76 33.6
Total 753 100.0 527 100.0 226 100.0
(b) Advantages of closed JSCs over open JSCs 
b
Managers can effectively control companies. 60 8.4 30 6.5 30 12.0
Very strict regulations imposed by the state on open joint-stock companies can be avoided. 131 18.3 92 19.8 39 15.6
The transfer of stock to outsiders can be prevented, and companies are protected from hostile takeover. 350 49.0 218 47.0 132 52.8
Even a small-scale enterprise could be set up as joint-stock company. 43 6.0 29 6.3 14 5.6
Others 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0
There is no comparative advantage. 130 18.2 95 20.5 35 14.0
Total 714 100.0 464 100.0 250 100.0
a Test for the equality of the composition of the responding firms by corporate form that gave a positive answer to each itemχ
2=51.079 (p=0.000).
b Test for the equality of the composition of the responding firms by corporate form that gave a positive answer to each itemχ
2=12.480 (p=0.014).
Table 2
Note. This tables shows the results of the answers from company managers participated in the joint enterprise survey to a question about the comparative advantages of open and closed JSCs over alternative
corporate form.  Closed JSCs include four workers' joint-stock companies (people's enterprises).
Comparative Advantages of Open and Closed Companies over an Alternative Corporate Form of Joint-stock Company













Legal restrictions on the number of shareholders, minimum required
capitalization (minimum share capital)
93 11.8 58 10.8 35 13.7
Mass-privatization policy for state-owned enterprises 349 44.1 291 54.4 58 22.7
Judgment by the managers and shareholders 248 31.4 133 24.9 115 44.9
Lack of consensus among managers and shareholders 7 0.9 3 0.6 4 1.6
Time and cost of changing the corporate form 21 2.7 10 1.9 11 4.3
Others 73 9.2 40 7.5 33 12.9
Total 791 100.0 535 100.0 256 100.0
a Test for the equality of the composition of the responding firms by corporate form that gave a positive answer to each item: χ
2=74.240 (p=0.000).
Table 3
Most Important Reason for Being in the Current Corporate Form 
Note. This tables shows the results of the answers from company managers participating in the joint enterprise survey to the question of what was the most important
reason for their companies having the current corporate form.  Closed JSCs include four workers' joint-stock companies (people's enterprises).
Closed JSCs 





Outsider ownership share (OWNOUT) 448 2.21 2.00 223 1.18
*** 0.00
###
State ownership share (OWNSTA) 473 0.66 0.00 236 0.12
*** 0.00
###
Federal government agencies ( OWNFED) 480 0.49 0.00 238 0.09
*** 0.00
###
Regional and local government agencies ( OWNREG) 478 0.23 0.00 237 0.05
*** 0.00
###
Private ownership share (OWNPRI) 449 1.72 0.00 223 1.06
*** 0.00
###
Commercial banks (OWNBAN) 470 0.19 0.00 231 0.07
** 0.00
###
Investment funds and other financial institutions ( OWNFIN) 465 0.31 0.00 233 0.09
*** 0.00
###
Non-financial corporations (OWNCOR) 463 1.06 0.00 237 0.69
*** 0.00
###
Foreign investors (OWNFOR) 469 0.37 0.00 234 0.31 0.00
##
Proportion of firms with a large managerial shareholder (shareholder group) ( MANSHA) 527 0.43 0.00 255 0.58
††† 1.00
###
Proportion of firms planning to issue securities in the near future ( SECPLA) 449 0.12 0.00 256 0.08 0.00
Proportion of firms with a long-term credit relationship with a certain commercial bank ( RELBAN) 529 0.85 1.00 256 0.76
††† 1.00
###
Proportion of member companies of a business group ( GROFIR) 553 0.41 0.00 269 0.36 0.00
Proportion of core corporations of a business group ( GROCOR) 553 0.05 0.00 269 0.06 0.00
Proportion of affiliated companies of a business group ( GROAFF) 553 0.35 0.00 269 0.31 0.00
Total number of member companies of a business group that a company belongs to ( GROSIZ) 536 7.67 0.00 261 9.98 0.00
Proportion of former state-owned or ex-municipal privatized firms ( PRICOM) 553 0.78 1.00 269 0.51
††† 1.00
###
Proportion of firms that separated from a state or privatized company ( SPIOFF) 553 0.09 0.00 269 0.11 0.00
Average number of employees ( COMSIZ) 553 2414.77 600.00 269 794.19
*** 300.00
###
a ***: The difference of the means in comparison with open JSCs is significant at the 1% level according to the t-test (the Welch test was performed instead of the t-test when the null-hypothesis that the
two samples have the same population variance was rejected by  F-test for homoscedasticity), 
**: at the 5% level; 
†††: The difference of the proportions in comparison with open JSCs is significant at the
1% level according to the χ2 test.
b 
###: The difference in comparison with open JSCs is significant at the 1% level according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum tes
##: at the 5% level
Table 4
Note. This table shows results from the univariate comparison of open and closed JSCs basing on the results of the joint enterprise survey.  Workers' joint-stock companies (people's enterprises) are
excluded from observations.  "Ownership share" means an ownership share rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 0%; 1: 10.0% or less; 2: 10.1 to 25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4: 50.1 to 75.0%; 5: 75.1 to
100.0%.  OWNOUT and OWNPRI  exclude ownership by domestic individual shareholders.   MANSHA, SECPLA, RELBAN, GROFIR, GROCOR, GROAFF, PRICOM and SPIOFF are dichotomous
variables, which take a value of 1 to corresponding firms.  The appendix provides detailed variable definitions.





Comparison between Open and Closed Joint-Stock Companies Regarding the Ownership Structure, Capital Demand and Supply Constraints, Relationship with















































** -0.113 -0.116 -0.175
* -0.124
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(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 557 555 555 557 525 534 389 527
Pseudo R
2 0.19 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.17 0.17
Log likelihood -295.70 -290.69 -286.06 -295.44 -283.83 -284.18 -211.91 -282.43
Model 8
The appendix provides detailed variable definitions.  The coefficients represent marginal effects.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard
errors are shown in parentheses.
Note. This table reports results from the regressions of the choice between open and closed JSCs on the variables reflecting the ownership
structure, capital demand and supply constraints, relationship with business groups, past policies on company start-ups, and company size .
Workers' joint-stock companies (people's enterprises) are excluded from observations.  We estimate models that take  CLOCOM, a qualitative
variable with a value of 1 assigned to closed JSCs, as the dependent variable by a probit regression.   Model 8 endogenizes corporate form and
ownership structure.  OWNOUT and MANSHA are instrumented by all exogenous variables in the right-hand side and a dummy variable of
shareholding by an incumbent CEO (or president) (CEOSHA); a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if there is a shareholder or a
shareholder group who substantially controls corporate management ( DOMSHA); the age level of the CEO or company president (CEOAGE);
and a three-point-scale assessment on the intensity of competition with domestic firms in a product market ( COMDOM).
***: significant at the 1% level; 
**: at the 5% level;  
*: at the 10% level.
a Type I: basic sample (available observations without firms that already issued securities in the past); Type II: excluding communications firms
from the basic sample; Type III: excluding those with the total number of employees exceeding the mean of number of employees of closed
JSCs (794.19 person) plus/minus 1 standard deviation (3,149.14) from the basic sample; Type IV: excluding those that experienced a change in
the major shareholders from 2001 to 2004 from the basic sample.
CLOCOM
Type I Type I Type I Type I Type II Type III Type IV
Table 5
Probit Regression Analysis of the Corporate-Form Choice Model
Type I
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7Open JSCs
Ownership limits are set by the corporate charter. 0.12  0.19
†† -2.234
Voting rights limits are set by the corporate charter. 0.16  0.19 -1.847
General shareholders
meeting
General shareholders meeting has a high degree of influence over
management decisions.
a 0.79  0.87
††† -0.345
Board of directors
Managerial directors constitute the majority (51% or more) of the
board of directors. 0.34  0.55
††† -1.995
Employee directors constitute the majority of the board of
directors. 0.01  0.05
††† -3.641
Outsider directors, including those representing the state,
constitute the majority of the board of directors. 0.58  0.33
††† 1.581
Private outside directors constitute the majority of the board of
directors. 0.51  0.33
††† 1.705
The chairman of the board of directors is an outsider. 0.33  0.26
†† 0.342
The board of directors includes a director(s) who represents non-
employee minor shareholders. 0.19  0.12
†† 0.919
The board of directors includes an independent director(s). 0.21  0.14
†† 1.307
A board of directors’ meeting is convened at least once a month. 0.46  0.34
††† -0.336
The board of directors has a high degree of influence on






Upper categories Lower categories
Table 6







The board of directors has a high degree of influence on
management decisions.
a 0.93 0.93 -0.048
The chairman of the board of directors has a high degree of
influence on management decisions.
a 0.84  0.83 0.076
Collective executive
organ
A collective executive organ is in place. 0.39  0.24
††† 0.257
A meeting of the collective executive organ is convened at least
once a month.
b 0.83  0.72
† 0.329
The collective executive organ has a high degree of influence on
management decisions.




Auditors representing employees and their union constitute the
majority of the audit committee. 0.46  0.51 -1.553
Outside auditors constitute the majority of the audit committee. 0.51  0.46 1.383
The audit committee members include a professional expert(s). 0.27  0.26 1.172
A meeting of the audit committee is convened at least once a
quarter. 0.44  0.37 -0.749
The audit committee has a high degree of influence on
management decisions.
a 0.49  0.46 -0.373
External auditors The external auditor is a foreign incorporated audit firm. 0.10  0.05
† 1.762
A meeting between management and the external auditor is held at
least once a quarter. 0.72  0.63
†† -0.225
The external auditor has a high degree of influence on management
decisions.
a 0.49  0.42
† 0.182
a Indicates firms that replied, "there is a certain degree of influence" or "there is a high degree of influence."
b Covering only firms with a collective executive organ
Note. This table shows results from the univariate comparison of open and closed JSCs in terms of internal organizational structure using the
results of the joint enterprise survey.   Workers' joint-stock companies (people's enterprises) are excluded from observations.  The data used
for comparison are qualitative variables (categorical data) collected from 553 surveyed firms.  The right column presents the categorical
quantity of the second eigenvalue computed by the Hayashi's quantification method III to measure the openness of the internal organizational


































































































-3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0
(b) Open JSCs (N=406)
(c) Closed JSCs (N=147)
Figure 1.  Distribution of the Openness Score of the Internal Organizational Structure
Note: This figure shows the distribution of the openness score of the internal organizational structure (OPESCO) in 553 firms participated in the joint enterprise
survey.  OPESCO is computed by the Hayashi's quantification method III using 24 qualitative variables (categorical data), which represent the characteristics of a
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Const. 0.233 0.112 0.526 0.621












(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
SECPLA -0.044 0.062 -0.122 -0.063






(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
NUMFIN -0.053 -0.074 -0.036 -0.128






(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.13)
PRICOM -0.018 -0.009 -0.036 -0.218
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16)
SPIOFF 0.001 0.004 -0.023 -0.179
(0.19) (0.19) (0.20) (0.23)
COMSIZ -0.002 -0.022 -0.049 -0.030
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 417 396 401 284
Adjusted R






Type I Type II Type III Type IV
a Type I: basic sample (available observations without firms that already issued
securities in the past); Type II: excluding communications firms from the basic
sample; Type III: excluding those with the total number of employees exceeding the
mean of number of employees of closed JSCs (794.19 person) plus/minus 1 standard
deviation (3,149.14) from the basic sample; Type IV: excluding those that experienced
a change in the major shareholders from 2001 to 2004 from the basic sample.
***: significant at the 1% level; 
**: at the 5% level;  
*: at the 10% level.
Table 7
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Note. This table reports results from the regressions of the openness of the internal
organizational structure on the variables reflecting the ownership structure, capital
demand and supply constraints, relationship with business groups, past policies on
company start-ups, and company size.  We estimate models that take OPESCO (the
openness score of the internal organizational structure) as the dependent variable by
OLS. The appendix provides detailed variable definitions.  Standard errors are shown
in parentheses.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are given when
the null-hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected at the 5% level or more by the
Breusch-Pagan test.




rate Median N N
Occurrence
rate Median N
Internal conflict in 2001-04 (INTCON) 355  0.21  0.00   182   0.23 0.00 165  0.19  0.00   194   0.25
† 0.00
#
Shareholder-initiated CEO turnover in 2001-04 (CEOTUR) 374  0.20  0.00   188   0.12
†† 0.00




†††: The difference of the proportions in comparison with its counter category is significant at the 1% level according to the χ
2 test, 
††: at the 5％ level, 
†: at the 10% level.
b 
###: The difference in comparison with its counter category is significant at the 1% level according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
##: at the 5% level, 





Openness of the internal organizational structure
Table 8
Note. This table shows results from the univariate comparison between open and closed JSCs and between the two groups of companies divided by the median of the openness of the internal organizational structure ( OPESCO) in terms of the
probability of an internal conflict between shareholders and management and shareholder-initiated CEO turnover in the period of 2001-04 using the results of the joint enterprise survey.   OPESCO is computed by the Hayashi's quantification
method III using 24 qualitative variables (categorical data), which represent the characteristics of a statutory corporate structure.  Table 6 reports its results.  The appendix provides detailed variable definitions of  INTCON and CEOTUR.





Comparison between Open and Closed JSCs and between the Two Groups of Companies Divided by the Openness of the Internal Organizational Structure in Terms of the Probability of an
Internal Conflict between Shareholders and Management and Shareholder-initiated CEO Turnover
















(0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
MANSHA 0.045 0.051 0.005 -0.173
*** -0.149
*** -0.169
(0.05) (0.06) (0.12) (0.05) (0.05) (0.11)
GROFIR -0.047 -0.069 -0.132 0.066 0.150
** -0.034
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03)
SALGRO -0.021 -0.010 -0.090
** 0.011 -0.003 0.014
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
COMSIZ 0.006 0.024 -0.073 -0.015 -0.025 0.008
(0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 317 238 74 321 237 73
Pseudo R
2 0.07 0.08 0.14 0.17 0.17 0.43
Log Likelihood -157.42 -115.93 -35.13 -121.27 -96.15 -15.53
***: significant at the 1% level; 
**: at the 5% level;  
*: at the 10% level.
Probit Regression Analysis of the Impacts of the Institutional Coordination of Corporate Form
and Internal Organizational Structure in a Joint-Stock Company on the Probability of Internal
Conflicts between Shareholders and Management and Shareholder-initiated CEO Turnover
INTCON CEOTUR




Note. This table reports results from the regressions of the internal conflicts between shareholders and top
management and the shareholder-initiated CEO turnover on the variables reflecting corporate form, openness of the
internal organizational structure, ownership structure, relationship with business groups, past firm performance, and
company size.  We estimate models that take INTCON, a qualitative variable, which takes a value of 1 for firms
that has experienced harsh infighting between managers and shareholders at least once from 2001 to 2004, or
CEOTUR, a qualitative variable, in which a value of 1 is assigned to companies that saw CEO turnover at the
request of shareholders at least once during the same period, as the dependent variable by a probit regression.  The
appendix provides detailed variable definitions.  White's heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in
parentheses.











Gross sales per employee in 2004 (1,000 rubles) 
c 328   3502.94   387.31  166   2917.03 341.67 156   6645.31   400.00  180   1452.89 333.33
###
Changes in gross sales in 2000–04 
e 371  1.65  2.00   187   1.51 2.00 168  1.83  2.00   195   1.38
*** 1.00
###
Changes in the total number of employees in 2001–05
 f 373  -0.13   0.00   189  0.27
*** 0.00
### 170  -0.19   0.00   195  0.06
* 0.00
##
Changes in average wages in 2000–04 
e 369  1.98  2.00   189   1.89 2.00 169  2.14  2.00   195   1.85
*** 2.00
###
Financial/economic situation (at the time of the survey)
 f 373  0.36  0.00   187   0.33 0.00 170  0.41  0.00   195   0.22 0.00
Frequency of dividend payments in 2001–03
 g 365  1.05  0.00   187   0.75
** 0.00
## 167  0.95  0.00   195   0.99 0.00
Intensiveness of investment in 2001–04
 h 364  1.16  1.00   184   0.98
*** 1.00
## 167  1.23  1.00   194   1.05
** 1.00
##
Changes in R&D expenditure in 2001–04
 i 370  1.42  2.00   186   1.36 2.00 169  1.48  2.00   194   1.46 2.00
Changes in marketing and advertising expenditure in 2001–04 
i 370  2.28  3.00   188   2.16 2.00
# 170  2.21  3.00   195   2.47
** 3.00
#
Introduction of new production facilities in 2001–04
 j 366  0.66  1.00   183   0.68 1.00 167  0.63  1.00   192   0.69 1.00
Employment of new technology in 2001–04
 j 364  0.54  1.00   184   0.51 1.00 167  0.54  1.00   192   0.53 1.00
Development of new products or services in 2001–04
 j 368  0.60  1.00   184   0.54 1.00 170  0.58  1.00   193   0.58 1.00
ISO certification obtained for own products in 2001–04
 j 360  0.48  0.00   182   0.31
††† 0.00
### 166  0.49  0.00   189   0.41 0.00
b 
###: The difference in comparison with its counter category is significant at the 1% level according to the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, 
##: at the 5% level, 
#: at the 10% level.
c Excluding discordant value.
d The changes are rated on the following 5-point scale: -1: decreased; 0: no change; 1: increased by less than 1.5 times; 2: increased by 1.5 or more but less than 2.0 times; 3: increased by 2.0 or more times.
e The changes are rated on the following 5-point scale: -2: decreased by 20% or more; -1: decreased by less than 20%; 0: no change; 1: increased by less than 20%; 2: increased by 20% or more.
f This item is rated on the following 5-point scale: -2: bad; -1: poor; 0: average; 1: good; 2: fairly good.
g  Excluding all firms established after 2001.
h  This item is rated on the following 3-point scale: 0: no investment made; 1: small-scale investment made; 2: large-scale investment made.
i  This item is rated on the following 4-point scale: 0: no spending; 1:  expenditure decreased; 2: expenditure remained unchanged; 3: expenditure increased.
j  This item takes a value of 1 to corresponding firms.





Comparison between Open and Closed JSCs and between the Two Groups of Companies Divided by the Openness of the Internal Organizational Structure in Terms of Firm Performance
Table 10
Note. This table shows the results of univariate comparison between open and closed JSCs and between the two groups of companies divided by the median of the openness of the internal organizational structure ( OPESCO) in terms of
business performance and restructuring activities using the results of the joint enterprise survey.   OPESCO is computed by the Hayashi's quantification method III using 24 qualitative variables (categorical data), which represent the





a ***: The difference of the means in comparison with its counter category is significant at the 1% level according to the t-test (the Welch test was performed instead of the t-test when the null-hypothesis that the two samples have the same
population variance was rejected by F-test for homoscedasticity), **: at the 5% level; †††: The difference of the proportions in comparison with its counter category is significant at the 1% level according to the χ2 test.
Corporate form Openness of the internal organizational structure
Open JSCsMean S.D. Min. Max.
CLOCOM Closed JSC dummy
 a 0.33 0.47 0 1
OPECOM Open JSC dummy
 a 0.67 0.47 0 1
OWNOUT Outsider ownership share 
b c 1.87 2.14 0 5
OWNSTA State ownership share
 b 0.37 1.02 0 5
OWNFED Ownership share by federal government agencies
 b 0.23 0.82 0 5
OWNREG Ownership share by regional and local government agencies
 b 0.17 0.70 0 5
OWNPRI Private ownership share
 b c 1.26 1.90 0 5
OWNBAN Ownership share by commercial banks
 b 0.11 0.50 0 5
OWNFIN Ownership share by investment funds and other financial institutions
 b 0.16 0.68 0 5
OWNCOR Ownership share by non-financial corporate shareholders
 b 0.88 1.65 0 5
OWNFOR Ownership share by foreign investors
 b 0.22 0.88 0 5
MANSHA Large managerial shareholder dummy
 a 0.51 0.50 0 1
SECPLA Securities issuance planning dummy
 a 0.06 0.29 0 2
RELBAN Relationship-banking dummy
 a 0.82 0.39 0 1
NUMFIN Number of financial institutions per 1000 firms in the location 1.19 0.31 0.54 2.18
GROFIR Business group participation dummy
 a 0.33 0.47 0 1
GROCOR Core business group member dummy
 a 0.05 0.22 0 1
GROAFF Business group affiliation dummy
 a 0.28 0.45 0 1
GROSIZ Natural logarithm of the total number of member firms of a business group 0.68 1.13 0 6.40
PRICOM Dummy for former state-owned or ex-municipal privatized companies
 a 0.69 0.46 0 1
SPIOFF Dummy for firms separated from state-owned or privatized companies
 a 0.10 0.30 0 1
COMSIZ Natural logarithm of the total number of employees 6.16 0.93 4.66 9.42
CEOSHA Dummy of shareholding by incumbent CEO (or company president)
 a 0.63 0.48 0 1
DOMSHA Dummy of a shareholder/shareholder group dominating corporate management
 a 0.87 0.33 0 1
CEOAGE Age level of incumbent CEO (or company president)
 d 2.43 0.91 0 5
COMDOM Intensity of competition with domestic firms in product market
 e 1.50 0.69 0 2
OPESCO Indicator of the openness of the internal organizational structure
 f -0.09 1.06 -2.91 2.02
INTCON Internal conflict dummy
 a 0.27 0.44 0 1
CEOTUR Shareholder-initiated CEO turnover dummy
 a 0.21 0.41 0 1
SALGRO Changes in gross sales 
g 1.62 1.27 -2 2
a  Dichotomous variable which takes a value of 1 to corresponding firms
c Excluding ownership by domestic individual shareholders
e  The intensity of competition is rated on the following 3-point scale: 0: no competition; 1: not very competitive; 2: very competitive
Appendix
f  Sample score computed by Hayashi's quantification method III using 24 qualitative variables (categorical data) which represent the characteristics
of a statutory corporate structure.  Table 6 reports its results.
Definition, Descriptive Statistics, and Data Source of Variables Used for Empirical Analysis
g The changes are rated on the following 5-point scale: -2: decreased by 20% or more; -1: decreased by less than 20%; 0: no change; 1: increased by
less than 20%; 2: increased by 20% or more.
b  "Ownership share" means an ownership share rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 0%; 1: 10.0% or less; 2: 10.1 to 25.0%; 3: 25.1 to 50.0%; 4:
50.1 to 75.0%; 5: 75.1 to 100.0%.
Source. NUMFIN was calculated by the author based on Rosstat (2005) and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (2005).  Other variables are
based on the results of the joint enterprise survey.
Descriptive statistics
Variable name Definition
d Age level is rated on the following 6-point scale: 0: 30 years old or less; 1: 31-40 years old; 2: 41-50 years old; 3: 51-60 years old; 4: 61-70 years
old; 5: 71 years old or more.